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Abstract
This paper reports the results of a replication experiment of a patent
race experiment by Zizzo (2002, International Journal of Industrial
Organization. 20, 877–902). First, the results of the replication exper-
iment are presented and compared to the results of the original one.
Secondly, the appropriate econometric models and a bootstrap vali-
dation method are employed. Third, data sets of both experiments,
the replication and the original, are pooled and analyzed jointly. In
addition, a so-called mixed model is introduced to control for different
type of heterogeneity observed in experiments. Basically, the replica-
tion is in many respects successful, and the results are generally in line
with the original study. However, there are differences which cannot
be entirely considered as random variation between samples. In con-
trast to the earlier study linear random effects model is inappropriate
with replication data and pooled data. Also the replication experiment
provides only limited support for the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: bootstrap method, panel models, patent races, replication
JEL Classification: C15, C33, C88, C91, O31
1 Introduction
The importance of replication studies is noticed within the field of exper-
imental economics. The scientific progress calls for replications and meta-
analysis studies since they can establish empirical facts on which the new
ideas in single studies are founded.1 The reporting and documentation of
experiments in experimental economics leans greatly on the guidelines pro-
vided Palfrey and Porter (1991) and others. However, the information of
conducted experiments is often insufficient to replicate earlier experiment(s),
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especially if the experimental design is not well-established.2 In practice, the
replication is typically done on basis of a published article (or a working pa-
per) from which some of the documented instructions, experimental design,
and results can be found. The raw data, estimation procedures and soft-
ware are seldom directly available with the published work, but normally
they can be requested from (or are made available by) the author.3
A low incentive to replicate, due to editorial policies, is another concern.4
Frequently, so-called conceptual replications, studies that are not identified
primarily as replications, are conducted to ‘search for the missing control
group’ by testing hypotheses that are not yet checked. For example new
elements are introduced to the design before the initial ones are soundly
studied. This problem can be partly addressed with diagnostic reasoning
and meta-analysis.5 Briefly the idea in diagnostic reasoning is to systemi-
cally search for a ‘faulty’ component in the experimental design, suggested
by negative/disconfirming evidence, and to replace it with a new one, and
proceeding recursively. However, a proper realization and documentation of
replications are needed to observe how results change with condition in the
first place, before one can proceed and include a new component (treatment
etc.) into the experimental design.
Hunter (2001), Lindsay and Ehrenberg (1993) and Posavac (2002) have
categorized replications into two main categories: the statistical [or exact]
replication and the scientific [or close] replication. The replication reported
in this paper can be categorized as the latter one [as replications in exper-
imental economics usually can]. Generally, the replication needs to fulfill
following conditions: the same independent and dependent variables are
measured, essentially the same procedures are used, and the sample is from
a population that is equivalent in terms of the study objective and outcome.
Notice that in case of statistical replication the word ‘same’ actually means
identical, while in scientific replication it is interpreted as equivalent.6 Dif-
ferences between the replication and the original study should only be due
to random variation, i.e. sampling variability. However, in addition to sam-
ple variability there can be errors from other sources; such as experimental
design, model specification or estimation methodology. In addition, one can
also search for ‘the edges of the robustness’ by conducting a critical differ-
entiated replication.7
In the original study, Zizzo (2002) experimentally tested a dynamic
multi-stage patent race model of Harris and Vickers [HV] (1987, Section
4). In this close replication the same experimental design, procedures and
analysis methods are used to review the HV predictions. Budd et al. (1993)
have reconsidered the framework with asymmetric setting in the context
of stochastic evolution of a dynamic duopoly. They specified four different
effects from which two, the joint-profit effect and the endpoint effect, are
at work in the context of patent race theory. The former is determined by
profit/payoff incentives and the latter by cost behavior. Recently Ho¨rner
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(2004) has introduced results of a more general dynamic framework iden-
tifying Markov perfect equilibria and two distinct situations or ‘triggers’
where a firm exerts high efforts. First, securing the position when lead is
sufficiently large and second, defending (or regaining) the leadership when
the lead (or the lag) is very small.
In other experiments closely related to the patent race theory, Sbriglia
and Hey (1994) reported results of a series of experiments concerning R&D
competition, where the experimental design was based on a search model
for innovations. They investigated investment strategies, selection of search
procedures, and the use of information. In their design, the effects of ex-
perience and information to the pace of innovative activity were the prime
objectives. Sbriglia and Hey argued that the theory does not provide a
satisfactory framework to study real-world patent races.
The current replication is mostly successful and the results are generally
in line with the original study. However, the bootstrap results indicate
that there are differences which cannot entirely be interpreted as random
variation between the samples. Only limited support for HV predictions
was found as in the original study. In the replication data there exists some
symptomatic evidence, albeit not statistically significant, supporting the
prediction “. . . the leader always makes greater efforts than the follower.”.
The prediction “. . . the race quickly approaches “monopoly” as the disparity
between player’s positions widens.” was not supported in the replication.
With the pooled data different type of heterogeneity of games and subjects
was observed between experiments: unobserved effects were fixed game-
specific rather than random player-specific according to specification tests.
Therefore, a so-called mixed model was introduced to control for observed
heterogeneity in both experiments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the experimental design, procedures, and characteristics of subjects. In Sec-
tion 3, the results of the replication experiment are presented and compared
to the original study. The bootstrap validation method is used for compar-
ison of parameter estimates. In addition, the estimation results of mixed
model with pooled data are presented. The last section concludes with a
discussion of the implications of the replication study.
2 Experimental design, subjects and software
The replication experiment was conducted in March 2004 at the University
of Joensuu consisting of eight sessions. In seven sessions there were four
subjects in each, and one session was conducted with eight subjects. In
total 36 subjects played 598 rounds of dyads. The sessions lasted between
45 and 60 minutes.
A recruiting method was an automated web form. A slight majority of
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randomly chosen participants were female (59.03%) and undergraduate stu-
dents (78.60%). One of the participants had a doctoral and one a licentiate
degree. The age distribution of the participants was quite similar (min 20,
max 51, mean 25.07, S.D. 5.30) between the studies, and the median, 23
years, was the same. One third of the participants (32.78%) had economics
or business backgrounds and the second third (33.78%) had humanities back-
ground, and the remaining participants consisted of several of disciplines like
social sciences and forestry. Some of the participants (21.24%) had prior ex-
perience on experiments.
The experimental design followed very closely the original experiment8
with the following practical exceptions. First, the instructions were trans-
lated into Finnish. Secondly, the currency was euro instead of sterling im-
plying different exchange rate for laboratory points; one point was worth
1.2 cents instead of 1 UK penny. Thirdly, the instructions consisted of a
table summarizing the experimental design (see Appendix A.1.). The total
winnings were 354.32 euros (without taxes and side-costs). The average of
the final winnings was 9.84 euros (S.D. 6.17, min 2.40, max 17.30) including
a 2.40 euros participation fee. As a summary, the experimental design and
the monetary incentives were practically equal between experiments.
The experiment was run in a computer classroom using novel Java-based
software.9 It is worth mentioning that the implementation of software was
distinct to the original experiment and used a different random number
generator.10 A short description of software and a screen shot during the
race can be found from Appendix A.2. The instructions were provided on
both paper and computer screens. In addition to the original experiment,
an extra questionnaire of 10 multiple-choice question was done before the
experiment to measure (and to control) each participant’s initial level of
understanding after reading the instructions. 11 The second automated
questionnaire was similar as in the original experiment and consisted of four
multiple-choice questions.
3 Results
3.1 General results
The data sets of the replication and the original experiments have similar
patterns. However, in descriptive analysis there are some differences con-
cerning merely the minimum and the maximum values of variables. Dura-
tions of dyads between experiments are similar, in the replication the mean
was 16.6 rounds with standard deviation of 1.79 (min 13, max 19), while
in the original study they were 16.1 with 2.42 (min 12, max 19). Portions
of tied rounds were similar between studies, 17.06% compared to 18.90%.
Investments were slightly, but not statistically, larger in the replication ex-
periment; the median was 5, the mean 4.51 and standard deviation 1.61,
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compared to 4.5, 4.06 and 2.15 in the original study.
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Figure 1: Distributions of investments in experiments.
The distributions of investments between experiments were dissimilar.
Figure 1 illustrates that the distribution is more concentrated in the repli-
cation experiment. In the original experiment, the investments have a lower
mean due to larger amount of low investments (below one) and the standard
deviation is larger due to two quite large investments (13 and 13.5).
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Figure 2: Reproduced Figure 4, replication (left) and original (right).
In the replication data there was a positive correlation between invest-
ment and round (Spearman’s ρ = 0.131, p = 0.001) as compared with
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the original study. Subjects with different backgrounds did not invest dif-
ferently than others in the replication experiment. There was a positive
correlation between investments in the practice stage and those in the real
stage (ρ = 0.128, p = 0.002). Similar to the original study there was a
positive correlation between progress and investment (ρ = 0.131, p = 0.001)
as well. The average binding index discussed extensively by Zizzo (2002) is
not considered in this paper.
If we compare the means and the standard deviations of investments of
the leaders, when there is still two progress steps to go, 4.592 and 1.908
to the original experiment 4.477 and 2.776 we notice that the means are
not equal. It is the same with the followers, 4.184 and 1.993 compared to
4.734 and 2.524. However, the means do not differ significantly according to
standard t-test. Even with a limited sample with score less than 100 points
(leaders 4.44 and followers 4.53) leaders appear to invest less in the original
study which is clearly not the case in the replication experiment (leaders
5.33 and followers 4.61). This is shown in Figure 2, corresponding to Figure
4 in Zizzo (2002, p.887).
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Figure 3: Reproduced Figure 5 in Zizzo (2002) with both data sets.
Investments seem to differ between experiments relative to progress gap
(the gap between competitors in progress steps). With the gap of three
or more the race should be characterized as ‘a virtual monopoly’, however,
it is not. In fact, the followers invest relatively more than the leaders.
Above values base on derived variable, ProgressSelfAnte12, which describes
the progress made at the beginning of each round rather than in the end of
the round characterizing theory better than just a plain Progress does when
there is two or less progress steps to go. In contrast to the original study,
the relationship between investment and size of gap is stronger for leaders
(ρ = −0.341, p = 0.006) than for followers (ρ = −0.279, p = 0.025).
In Figure 3, the reproduced Figure 5 in Zizzo (2002, p. 888), illustrates
the differences between the studies in investments in relation to progress gap
with the full sample. From Figure 3 we can see that even with full sample
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there is no monopoly by the leader, that is, the HV prediction does not get
support. Instead it seems that the shape of the investments in Figure 3
exhibits two cases suggested by Ho¨rner (2004), even though the model and
the framework are more complex.
3.2 Estimation results of replication
The analysis justifications and the basis for choosing variables are from the
original study.13 The first set of variables (Progress × tie, Positive gap and
Negative gap (and squared terms), and Leader) are chosen to represent the
HV predictions. The second set of variables (Progress, Small score, Expany,
Practice stage variables, etc.) are mostly chosen to represent the experimen-
tal design and to control certain factors. The last set of variables consists of
demographical control variables (Age, Sex, and Educational background).
The HV predicts that both the Leader and the Interaction term (Progress
× tie) to have positive coefficients. Only in one model the interaction term
is positive and significant. It is also predicted that the correlation between
gap and investment should be more negative for the followers than for the
leaders. This is not the case with the full sample (correlations are -0.138
and -0.113).
The results of Models 1 to 5 on investments with the replication data
are presented in Table 1, corresponding to the results in Zizzo (2002). The
same random effects specification is used. In Models 1 to 4 the marginal
effect of the progress of tied competitors on investment is studied through
Progress variable. For Model 5 this indirect effect is removed and a ‘pure’
Progress × tie effect is examined. As a summary, for all five models, we may
conclude that the results are generally similar to the original study. Most
of the independent variables are significant and the coefficients have same
signs, except for Sex, which implies that in the replication males invested
significantly less than females. The HV prediction that the overall impact of
negative gaps on investment should be negative and more negative than the
impact of positive gaps was not supported. The estimation results raised
doubts about the (multi)collinearity problem not only between Leader and
Positive gap, ρ = 0.9575 with p = 0.0000, but also between Positive gap and
Negative gap (ρ = −0.6388, p = 0.0000). Also educational background vari-
ables seem to be (multi)collinear. Thus some variables should be dropped
from the ‘candidate model’.
Specification testing implies that the random effects specification used
in the original study is inappropriate for the replication data. Breusch and
Pagan LM test (H0: V ar(ui) = 0) for Model 1 is insignificant (χ2(1) = 0.85,
Prob > χ2 = 0.357) and Hausman specification test is significant (χ2(8) =
43.65(39.41), Prob > χ2 = 0.000(0.000)).14
Estimation results of Model 1 with the replication data using the fixed ef-
fects specification shows that there is a strong negative correlation (−0.378)
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Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Progress 0.098 0.033 0.003** 0.033 0.163
Positive gap -0.230 0.0672 0.001** -0.362 -0.098
Negative gap -0.170 0.055 0.002** -0.278 -0.063
Small score -1.228 0.279 0.000*** -1.777 -0.680
Round17 1.060 0.377 0.005** 0.319 1.801
Round18 1.418 0.493 0.004** 0.450 2.387
Round19 2.087 0.670 0.002** 0.771 3.404
Constant 4.494 0.145 0.000*** 4.209 4.779
R2 within 0.094
R2 between 0.002
R2 overall 0.058
Significance levels: ***=0.001, **=0.01 and *=0.05
Table 1: Estimation results of game-specific fixed effect model.
between the explanatory variables xit and the fixed individual specific ef-
fects ui making the random effects estimator inconsistent with the replica-
tion data. The F -test (H0: all ui = 0) is significant (F (35, 554) = 1.50,
Prob > F = 0.036), evidently justifying the use of the fixed effect specifica-
tion. The results in Table 3 indicate that there exists (fixed) heterogeneity
between games.
3.3 Bootstrap results
The results of an ideal experimental design should maintain validity (both
internal and external) irrespectively of subjects’ characteristics and other
factors if we are able to control them properly. Basically, the uncertainty,
biases and errors in experimental data-analysis and modelling stem from
four different sources: (i) experimental error due to design (some factors are
not under control), (ii) misspecified model (omitted variable problem etc.),
(iii) estimation uncertainty, and (iv) sampling variability.
An ideal unbiased experiment should minimize (or even eliminate) the
experimental uncertainty and error. If we are not able to find the ‘true’
model that describes the design and controls for all relevant game- and
subject-specific effects, the regression model results are biased due misspec-
ification (or the omitted variable problem). Despite the fact that models in
econometrics are always not-deterministic, i.e. incomplete in some sense, in
the experimental setting we should be able to reduce the severity of biases
prominently (or in an ideal case we should be able to make the model almost
deterministic). Then the two remaining sources of model uncertainty, i.e.
estimation uncertainty and sampling variability, can both be analyzed and
illustrated empirically.
Generally, the methods deriving parameter estimates, like GLS in this
case, involve errors due the sampling variability and non-ideal data. The
bootstrap method, introduced by Efron (1979) is a re-sampling validation
method whereby information in the data is ‘recycled’ for estimating the dis-
tributions of sample statistics, estimates in this case. It is based on an idea
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that the sample we have is a good representation of the underlying popu-
lation. By comparing the estimates computed from different sub-samples,
one can analyze how representative the estimates are. In this paper only
the results of Model 4 are considered. We observe that the point and in-
terval estimates do differ (see Table 2), as they do with all the five models.
However, the result might be an outcome of sampling variability. If the
bootstrap confidence intervals for parameter estimates are not overlapping
with estimates from the initial and the replication data, then we are forced
to argue that the results differ partly due to the modeling uncertainty or
the omitted variable problem, and then we need to reconsider and re-specify
the model to control the unobserved effects appropriately. An alternative
explanation is that there is something wrong with the experimental design
and we need to re-design the experiment.
Since parameter estimates are not directly comparable between the stud-
ies, due to distinct model specifications, we address the matter by using the
improved bootstrap method BCa15, which produces automatically confi-
dence intervals that are second-order correct, to check how the nominal con-
fidence intervals of parameter estimates behave. The bias-corrected and ac-
celerated 95% confidence intervals (BCaCI), nominal estimates (Observed),
bias values (Bias) and nominal 95% confidence intervals (CI) with 10000
replications are reported in Table 2. Figure 6 in Appendix B illustrates the
differences in distributions of parameter estimates between experiments.
The results in Table 2 and Figure 6 in Appendix B indicate that point es-
timates are generally qualitative similar between studies. Most independent
variables are significant and coefficients have same signs. However, the boot-
strap estimates differ remarkably from the nominal ones and across the two
experiments. There is hardly any overlapping for 95% nominal and BCa
confidence intervals. Variable Small score, the proxy for binding budget
constraint, seems to have almost equal distribution between experiments.
To summarize, experiments seem to have statistically different properties
suggesting alternative specification.
3.4 Results of mixed model with pooled data
The pooled data set (in total 1180 observations) consist of original and repli-
cation data sets. By pooling data sets we get a continuum of experiments
and accumulate experimental data in sense of meta-analysis. With larger
data set more efficient parameter estimates can be produced due to larger
degrees of freedom.
In the pooled data set the correlation between investment and Sex, and
some other demographic variables is insignificant, but between Age and
Economics it is not, ρ = −0.109 with p = 0.000 and ρ = 0.074 with p =
0.011, respectively. These imply that in general older subjects tend to invest
less and economic students tend to invest more than others.16
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For Model 1 with pooled data set both Breusch and Pagan LM test
(χ2(1) = 54.93, Prob > χ2 = 0.000) and Hausman test (χ2(8) = 33.59,
Prob > χ2 = 0.029) are significant. With fixed effect specification there
exists some negative correlation (-0.177) between explanatory variables and
game-specific effects. The null (all ui = 0) is rejected by F -test (F (35, 1124) =
4.36, P rob > F = 0.000) justifying the use of specification.
A candidate model, a so-called mixed effects model, which consist a
mixture of fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) is introduced.17 The
model includes a dummy variable Replication, indicating observations from
the replication data set, which implies that investments were significantly
larger in replication than in the original experiment. Also the round-dummies
for the last rounds (between 16 and 19), which represent endpoint effects
discussed in Budd et al. (1993), are included. The mixed model can be
written in the following form:
(3.1) yijt = α+ µi + νj + x′ijtβ + εijt,
where i denotes individual, j denotes game and t denotes period. Exogenous
variables are denoted by xijt, β is matrix of coefficients, α is a general con-
stant, µi is unobservable subject-specific effect treated as random (normally
distributed, i.e. µi ∼ N(0, σ2µ), νj is unobservable game-specific effect which
is treated as fixed and εijt denotes remainder disturbance.
Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value 95% Confidence Interval
Progress 0.187 0.027 0.000*** 0.134 0.239
Positive gap -0.274 0.048 0.000*** -0.369 -0.180
Negative gap -0.087 0.038 0.023* -0.163 -0.012
Small score -1.145 0.239 0.000*** -1.614 -0.676
Average investment 0.430 0.082 0.000*** 0.270 0.590
in practice stage
Replication 1.395 0.215 0.000*** 0.975 1.816
Gamed20 2.189 0.360 0.000*** 1.483 2.895
Gamed21 1.612 0.353 0.000*** 0.920 2.304
Gamed22 1.506 0.407 0.000*** 0.708 2.303
Gamed23 0.901 0.357 0.012* 0.202 1.600
Gamed24 2.308 0.377 0.000*** 1.569 3.046
Gamed27 0.979 0.376 0.009** 0.242 1.715
Gamed28 1.598 0.362 0.000*** 0.888 2.307
Gamed29 2.276 0.400 0.000*** 1.492 3.060
Gamed31 1.189 0.363 0.001** 0.479 1.900
Gamed32 1.431 0.372 0.000*** 0.703 2.160
Gamed33 1.682 0.368 0.000*** 0.960 2.404
Gamed34 1.031 0.368 0.005** 0.309 1.753
Gamed36 2.599 0.415 0.000*** 1.787 3.412
Round16 -0.503 0.266 0.058 -1.024 0.017
Round17 0.968 0.307 0.002** 0.367 1.569
Round18 1.056 0.375 0.005** 0.322 1.791
Round19 0.895 0.544 0.100 -0.171 1.962
Constant 0.703 0.307 0.022* 0.102 1.304
R2 within 0.115
R2 between 0.741
R2 overall 0.248
Significance levels: ***=0.001, **=0.01 and *=0.05
Table 4: Estimation results of mixed model (GLS regression).
Mixed model is very intuitive for pooled data since in previous experi-
ment subject-specific random effects were significant, but on the other hand
11
in the replication experiment game-specific fixed effects were significant.
Model makes it possible to control both statistical different properties and
heterogeneity of experiments at the same time. Estimation results are pre-
sented in Table 4. As we can see R2 between is large due to both controlled
fixed game-specific effects and random variation between subjects. Also the
overall coefficient of determination is larger than in previous models giving
us some prediction power.
The heterogeneity between both games and subjects is controlled by
using the mixed model. Also other estimation methods, i.e. ML and adap-
tive (also ordinary) quadrature for multilevel generalized linear mixed mod-
els (gllamm in Stata), were used to evaluate the efficiency and consistency
of mixed effects model.18 Loosely speaking, the game-specific fixed effects
absorb both observed and unobserved subject-specific fixed effects which
cannot be controlled by using plain RE- or FE-specifications. The subject-
specific random effects of the mixed model are illustrated below. There
exists an endpoint effect according to round dummies (Round16-Round19).
Investments tend to increase in the end of the races dropping again in the
very last round.
0
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e
n
s
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y
−.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Random effects (u_i)
Figure 4: Distribution of random effects in mixed model.
4 Conclusion
To conclude, the replication was mostly successful and the results of the
replication experiment are generally in line with the original one. How-
ever, the data sets of the experiments have statistically different properties
according to the specification tests indicating that the unobserved effects
are fixed game-specific rather than random subject-specific in replication
data. Also the bootstrap results suggest that there are differences which
cannot entirely be interpreted as random variation between samples. From
the demographic variables only Age and Economics were significant in both
12
experiments implying that the subject-specific variables are not universal
and need to be controlled.
To summarize, the replication provides also limited support for HV pre-
dictions as the original experiment. However, there is suggestive evidence
that the replication experiment is more favorable to the HV prediction than
the original experiment in sense that the leader always makes greater ef-
fort than the followers. In contrast, the follower invested significantly more
when the gap was five and less when the gap was two. Efforts were not
significantly larger in a neck-to-neck situation.
Clearly we cannot control all the factors in the current experimental
design even with appropriate econometric models. Thus more research is
needed and more experiments are needed to be conducted. In the words of
Spanos (1999) “. . .model specification and the design of the experiment are
the two sides of the same coin. The design purports to isolate the causal
relationship between inputs and outputs and what is beyond the control of
the experimenter should be non-systematic; often a white noise error.”. If
this is not feasible, then there is a chance that the experimental design or
estimation methods (or both) have ignored certain factors, which cannot be
assumed away. Next logical step is to redesign the experiment in order to
achieve control over the experimental setting, or at least neutralize these
systematic unobserved effects. However, in experimental economics it is
rarely possible to achieve total control over the experiment and identify
factors and effects. Thus, we should consider appropriate methods and
replications jointly as a controlling device alongside diagnostic reasoning
and meta-analysis.
In the current multivariate analysis an important determinant, dynam-
ics (i.e. investment lags), have been omitted and left uncontrolled. Prelimi-
nary results of VAR(2) models and impulse response analysis in Ka¨hko¨nen
(2004) suggest that subjects’ decisions are characterized by actions two pe-
riods backwards giving us some insights to dynamic behavioral aspect. This
observation supports the results of Ho¨rner (2004), and points out the impor-
tance of ‘decision history’ in the current experimental setting, where only
previous round’s values were displayed to the subjects which can partly ex-
plain the low order AR process. Therefore, more advanced methods (for
example panel VAR models) are needed to model dynamics and to take the
underlying heterogeneity into account. Next possibly step to ease analysis
could be idea of abstracting other human player out of design, and ‘making
uncertainty more certain’ to the subjects which would certainly be a stress
test for the theory. Future studies should also consider closely related issues
like the persistence of monopolies, asymmetric information, different market
structures or sequential innovations.
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Appendix A. Additional instructions and software
A.1. Additional instructions
The experimental design and instructions followed very closely to the original
experiment. In addition information in Table 5 was included in instructions
(translated naturally in Finnish) to summarize the experimental design to
the subjects. Other instructions which are available from the author are
shortened (three pages) translated version of Zizzo’s (2002) instructions.
Concept Player X Player Y
Investment x y
Cost of investment cx = x2 cy = y2
Winning probability px = x/(x+ y) py = y/(x+ y)
“Winning rule” X wins if random(0, 1) < px Y wins if random(0, 1) > px(= 1− py)
Table 5: A summary of key concepts of design provided to subjects.
A.2. A brief description of software
The experimental software was programmed by using Java programming
language in co-operation with the Department of Computer Science at the
University of Joensuu. The software runs over the Internet (or LAN) in
browser with a Java plug-in (JRE version: 1.4.1 or higher). See figure below
for a screen shot during the race. For further information contact the author.
Figure 5: Screen shot of subject’s view during the race.
14
Appendix B. Distributions of bootstrap estimates of Model 4
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Figure 6: Distributions of bootstrap estimates with 10000 replications.
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Notes
1See for example Hunter (2001).
2This fault is also pointed out by Zelmer (2003, p.307).
3The data, estimation procedures and other information about the replication experi-
ment can be found from author’s home page, URL: http://cc.joensuu.fi/∼atkahkon/.
4The problem is discussed for example in Hunter (2001) and Lindsay and Ehrenberg
(1993). The Experimental Economics is a pleasant exception providing an outlet for such
studies.
5See Tammi (2004) for extent discussion on coordination and diagnostic reasoning, and
Zelmer (2003) for meta-analysis on linear public good experiments.
6See for example to Hunter (2001).
7See Hunter (2001), Lindsay and Ehrenberg (1993) and Posavac (2002) for discussion
on topic and different conditions of replications.
8See Zizzo (2002) for details on the experimental design.
9Parts of the Java program and source code are available from the author on request.
10Instead of embedded MS Visual Basic Randomize calls used in initial study, a Java
random function (float)Math.random() was used.
11Results of first questionnaire were used in econometric analysis, but they were found
to be insignificant. However, a dummy variable Correct for subjects who answered correct
to all ten questions was correlated (0.415) and significant (0.000) between subjects with
experimental experience (Expany).
12I thank Daniel Zizzo for providing description of variable with instructions to compute
it as well as ready computed values with original data.
13See legend of Table 2 for a short description of variables, and Zizzo (2002) for a more
specific description.
14Results of more general Hausman’s (1978) specification test for the random-effects are
reported in parenthesis, difference bases on distinct test-statistics, however, the interpre-
tation does not change.
15See Efron (1987) for introduction.
16However, if we divide subjects to two age-groups, over 26 years old and 26 and under,
we observe that the former age-group invests significantly less (ρ = −0.095, p = 0.001).
We also observe that Sex and Age are positively correlated (ρ = 0.126, p = 0.000). Yet
another problem in analysis is due to zero investments (8 observations in replication and 10
observations in original experiment) which could be solved by using truncated regression
or Tobit model. In addition, one player ran out of points in the replication experiment
(4 observations). Possible explanation for zero investments in experiments is a simple
rule of thumb or myopic heuristic decision of saving points for later rounds or trying to
16
drive competitor out of points. However, the zero investment is not rationalizable strategy
since by investing nothing subjects lose round for sure. Strategy of playing zero is strictly
dominated, and is never a best response implying that subjects are not perfectly rational
which can partly explain the failure of HV predictions in experimental setting.
17See e.g. Searle (1987, Chapter 13) for a survey on mixed models.
18Estimation results available on request.
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